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Andrew W.  Lo 
On January 1, 1989, the Swedish government implemented a transactions tax 
on fixed-income securities and associated derivatives. In comparison to its eq- 
uity counterparts, the fixed-income tax was rather small, reaching a maximum 
of only fifteen basis points of the notional amount traded. Nevertheless, during 
the first week of  the tax, trading volume for bonds dropped by  85 percent, 
trading volume for futures on bonds and bills dropped by 98 percent, and trad- 
ing in fixed-income derivatives all but disappeared (see Campbell and Froot 
1994). This was accompanied by an increase in the variety and trading volume 
of nontaxable substitute securities, securities with almost identical riskheturn 
profiles  to  their  taxable  counterparts,  for  example,  Swedish  debentures, 
variable-rate  notes, forward-rate agreements, and swaps. On April  15, 1990, 
the tax was abolished, and trading volume quickly returned to pre-1989 levels. 
The Swedish experience is only one of many recent examples that illustrate 
the flexibility and creativity with which financial systems adapt to changes in 
their operating environments, sometimes with unanticipated  and unintended 
consequences. It also illustrates the complexities that face regulators in their 
attempts to correct market failures and improve social welfare. Regulating fi- 
nancial markets is not unlike managing an artificial ecology: in both cases, 
the goals are multifaceted and not always mutually consistent, the regulatory 
instruments  are relatively  few and blunt, and the agents react  and adapt to 
changes in their environment in sophisticated ways that are not entirely under- 
stood or predictable. Moreover, the principles governing economic systems are 
considerably more fickle than those governing biological and physical systems. 
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agement at the Massachusetts Institute of  Technology and a research associate of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
1 2  AndrewW.Lo 
These challenges provided the motivation for the NBER’s conference “The 
Industrial Organization and Regulation of the Securities Industry,” held Janu- 
ary 20-22,  1994, in Key Largo, Florida. A smaller preconference  planning 
meeting was held in Cambridge on July 17, 1992, to solicit ideas for the scope 
and organization of the conference. 
Although the study of regulation has become an important part of the indus- 
trial organization literature, and although it has played a tremendous role in 
determining the fate of  the airlines, telecommunications,  transportation, and 
public utilities industries, relatively little attention has been paid to the indus- 
trial organization and regulation of the securities industry. 
Of course, this is not to say that financial market regulation is new-indeed, 
regulations covering financial transactions can be found in the recorded histor- 
ies of even the most ancient civilizations. But the notion that economic prin- 
ciples can be successfully applied to the design and implementation of regula- 
tory structures is a relatively modern one. And while economists have figured 
prominently  in many regulatory  debates-Ronald  Coase, Alfred  Kahn, and 
George Stigler, to name just a few-their  domain has not yet broadened to 
include financial market regulation, which has been dominated historically by 
lawyers, legislators, lobbyists, and an occasional practitioner or two. It is only 
very recently, and most visibly at this NBER conference, that financial regula- 
tion has begun to be discussed and debated in the jargon of traditional regula- 
tion economics: market failure, monopoly power, price discrimination, exter- 
nalities, barriers to entry, and so forth. 
The series of breakthroughs in our understanding of financial market risks 
and returns that economists have achieved over the past thirty years, coupled 
with the recent explosion of financial innovation in the securities industry, sug- 
gests that the time is ripe for economists to turn their attention to the securities 
industry. Contributions by Merton (1993) and Ross (1989) and those in Lehn 
and Kamphuis (1993) may signal the start of such a trend. 
To encourage and support this trend, the NBER held a preconference meet- 
ing to engage industrial organization economists,  financial  economists,  and 
practitioners in a dialogue about the most pressing issues facing financial mar- 
ket participants and regulators today. This dialogue grew quickly in scope and 
depth, and this conference volume is the culmination of the many ideas and 
issues that surfaced at that initial meeting. 
Like many other NBER conferences, this conference was organized around 
the ten papers selected for presentation, with two discussants assigned to each 
paper. However, there was one very important difference. Because of the nov- 
elty of  the conference topic, and because there was an underlying  intention 
to spark research collaboration among three well-developed but rather insular 
academic disciplines-industrial  organization, finance, and law-the  confer- 
ence participants were carefully selected to represent all three disciplines, with 
additional representation from regulatory agencies and the securities industry. 
In addition to the usual complement of economists from academia, the audi- 3  Introduction 
ence and discussants included practicing lawyers and legal scholars of securi- 
ties law, portfolio managers, brokers and market makers, stock exchange offi- 
cials, several former and current commissioners  of  the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, the chief 
economist of the SEC, and the supreme court justice of the state of Delaware. 
The papers and the discussants’ comments contained in this volume will pro- 
vide readers with only a small glimpse of the exhilarating and dynamic ex- 
changes among speakers, discussants, and the audience. 
In chapter  1, William Albrecht,  Corinne Bronfman, and Harold Messen- 
heimer develop a framework for analyzing the efficiency of various regulatory 
structures. They begin with the premise that there are three goals of efficient 
financial regulation: (1) customer protection; (2) financial system integrity; and 
(3) market price integrity. However, typical regulatory incentives are not al- 
ways consistent with these goals; hence some changes in the structure of fi- 
nancial services regulation may improve efficiency. For example, they find that 
increasing competition  among regulatory  agencies of  substitute markets in- 
creases efficiency, but increasing competition among regulatory agencies of 
complement markets decreases efficiency. They conclude that the construction 
of efficient regulatory structures must include a careful analysis of the incen- 
tives facing regulators and the degree of complementarity or substitutability of 
the products to be regulated. 
In chapter 2, Kathleen Hagerty and Robert McDonald focus on market frag- 
mentation,  an  issue of  increasing  importance  as  financial markets  become 
more highly computerized and payment for order flow becomes more preva- 
lent. Market fragmentation refers to the splintering of securities trading across 
many different markets and dealers, resulting in less liquidity than if the trad- 
ing were centralized. Hagerty and McDonald propose a model of market frag- 
mentation  in  which  some investors have  valuable  private  information  and 
others do not, and the efficient economic response to this asymmetry of infor- 
mation is what we perceive as fragmentation. They show that fragmentation 
may be a reflection of increased price competition among dealers, and that a 
fragmented market may provide better prices for customers than a less frag- 
mented monopolistic dealer market. While their model does not capture every 
aspect of the market fragmentation issue, it does provide an important insight: 
central markets and brokerage markets serve different needs for different in- 
vestors; hence reducing fragmentation may not necessarily improve market ef- 
ficiency. 
To complement Hagerty and McDonald’s theoretical analysis, in chapter 3 
Thomas McInish and Robert Wood provide an empirical analysis of fragmenta- 
tion in which they use bid-ask  spreads and other price data to measure the 
potential  costs of  dispersing orders  among multiple  market  centers.  Using 
transaction data from  1991, they form five equity portfolios that are nearly 
identical in those attributes that should affect their spreads, premiums (the dif- 
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ing bid-ask spreads), and volatility, but as different as possible in the fragmen- 
tation  of  their orders. By  comparing  the properties  of these portfolios, one 
can better observe the effects of fragmentation while controlling for economic 
factors that might otherwise confound the comparison. McInish and Wood find 
that bid-ask spreads and premiums are reduced by a decrease in fragmentation, 
while volatility seems unaffected. However, while the reduction in spreads is 
statistically significant, the range of the spread across the five portfolios is only 
0.6 cent. 
The impact of technology on financial markets is further underscored by Ian 
Domowitz’s study on computer-automated  equity trading systems in chapter 
4. Trading systems such as Instinet, POSIT, and the Arizona Stock Exchange 
have stretched the limits of existing securities regulation, much of  which was 
drafted before the personal computer and workstation revolution.  Domowitz 
begins with a brief historical review of such trading systems and then turns his 
attention to how they are classified in the current regulatory environment, no 
small matter,  since the  classification  of  an automated trading  system deter- 
mines how it is to be regulated. The classification problem calls into question 
the very definition of a securities exchange, and Domowitz develops a more 
complete definition, distilled from legislative, legal, and SEC decisions, that 
identifies trade execution, price quotes, price discovery, and liquidity as key 
characteristics. While such a definition blurs the exchangelnonexchange  dis- 
tinction, it suggests that Merton’s (1993) “functional” approach to designing 
securities regulation may be more effective than current practice. 
Another example of the impact of technology on the securities industry is 
provided by Peter Reiss and Ingrid Werner’s study of trading costs on the Lon- 
don Stock Exchange (LSE) in chapter 5. In  1986, the LSE switched from a 
closed, floor-based broker-dealer market to an open electronic quotation sys- 
tem called SEAQ. This system operates much like the National Association of 
Securities Dealers’ Nasdaq dealer system: competing market makers post bid 
and ask prices and guaranteed trading volumes, but while SEAQ also displays 
trade information, brokers and dealers still negotiate trades by phone. The in- 
troduction of SEAQ coincided with the LSE’s adoption of best execution rules 
and elimination of fixed commissions. 
Reiss and Werner present a thorough empirical analysis of these liquidity- 
enhancing innovations of the LSE, using newly available 1991 SEAQ intraday 
quotation and transaction data. They develop a new  measure of transaction 
costs that incorporates information on dealers’ quotes and investors’ transac- 
tions to capture the hypothetical cost of  an immediate round-trip transaction. 
Using this measure, they  find that medium  and large trades often receive  a 
discount off the best or “touch” bid-offer spread, whereas small and very large 
trades pay the touch or more. For wider touches, the discounts are larger. And 
finally, dealers and market makers treat  customer trades differently: dealers 
tend to discount medium and large trades routinely, whereas market makers 
discount only very large trades. These patterns raise several interesting issues 5  Introduction 
for further study, particularly in the context of information- or inventory-based 
theories of marketing making in which discounts have not yet played a role. 
In chapter 6, Robert Neal and David Reiffen present an empirical analysis 
of  the potential impact of the vertical integration of broker-dealers with spe- 
cialists on trading costs. Although changes in the degree of vertical integration 
within a firm are rare and often triggered by unobserved  events, in  1986 the 
New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange relaxed their rules 
concerning the relationship between brokerage firms and specialists. Neal and 
Reiffen take advantage of this structural change in exchange policy by examin- 
ing data on combinations  of  broker-dealer  and specialist units on the New 
York, American, and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges between  1987 and 1993. 
Common objections to this type of vertical integration center on the possibility 
of increased trading costs for investors, due to moral hazard (brokers directing 
order to their own specialists rather than searching for the best price), or be- 
cause integration ‘‘forecloses’’ a share of the market otherwise open to compe- 
tition. Neal and Reiffen find that neither of these theories is supported by post- 
integration  transaction  data. Average  trade  sizes  decline  on  the  integrated 
exchanges, and there is some evidence for a divergence of order flow, but there 
is little evidence of  a statistically significant increase in trading costs subse- 
quent to integration. 
Defining the regulatory environment of the securities industry is a nontrivial 
endeavor because of the industry’s global reach. Each sovereign nation has its 
own regulatory agencies, with unique charters, incentives, and organizational 
structures, and these agencies must often operate across geopolitical bound- 
aries. In chapter 7, Lawrence White addresses these issues by asking whether 
regulatory regimes should be harmonized internationally or be allowed to com- 
pete-harmonization  can create a “level playing field,” but competition may 
enhance the efficiency of capital flows. Using the concepts of market failure 
(externalities,  market power, asymmetric  information, etc.) and  government 
failure  (rent-seeking  behavior, rent-creating  capture,  weak  incentives,  etc.), 
White argues that competition should be a “default”: in the absence of substan- 
tial  market and government  failures, competition  among regulatory  regimes 
will lead to more efficient outcomes. But when market and government failures 
do exist, harmonization can be critical to correcting these failures. 
Another important factor that governs and sometimes restricts the coordina- 
tion of regulatory regimes across countries is the indigenous institutional envi- 
ronment of each country, which often changes slowly through time. Kenneth 
Singleton’s study in chapter 8 highlights this factor by comparing the behavior 
of  cash and futures prices for government bonds in Germany, Japan, and the 
United States. These three countries are at different stages of the financial lib- 
eralization process, and have different market structures, market-making costs, 
and liquidity. Singleton uses the joint distribution of cash and futures prices as 
a yardstick to measure the differences across these three countries. Using daily 
and weekly bond data from October 1, 1991, to November 30, 1993, he finds 6  Andrew W.Lo 
that the institutional settings in Germany and Japan, which contain consider- 
ably more frictions, are reflected in fatter-tailed distributions and, in the case 
of Japan, higher serial correlation for changes in bond yields. The presence of 
frictions in the cash market also imply a much more important price discovery 
role for the more liquid futures market, with Japan providing the extreme ex- 
ample where cash prices are priced almost exactly off the futures price. These 
patterns underscore the important link between the institutional environment 
in  which  price  discovery  occurs  and  the  time-series  properties  of  fixed- 
income yields. 
The fact that institutional differences can be very significant indeed is also 
highlighted by Bruce Lehmann and David Modest’s detailed analysis of liquid- 
ity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in chapter 9. Contrary to most orga- 
nized equity exchanges in which designated market makers provide liquidity 
continuously, the TSE has a public limit order book in which incoming orders 
are matched according to strict priority  rules based on price, time, and size. 
Therefore, it is the investor public that absorbs temporary imbalances between 
supply and demand, not designated market makers. When order imbalances 
are too large in either direction, the TSE provides warning and special quote 
(chi  and tokubetsu kehai) mechanisms to flag such imbalances and to halt 
trading to attract orders to correct the imbalance. Using TSE transactions data 
from January  1, 1991, to November 30, 1991, and February  1, 1992, to April 
30,  1993-yielding  a  staggering  25,863,726  transactions-Lehmann  and 
Modest conclude that trading halts are seldom triggered by investors, and when 
they are, the investors usually execute all or part of their order at the warning 
quote, a price known in advance. Moreover, trading volume is similar when 
orders do and do not result in trading halts. Although it is tempting to infer 
from this that designated market makers may not provide as much liquidity as 
we thought, Lehmann and Modest are quick to point out that it is impossible 
to distinguish between the success of the TSE market mechanisms and invest- 
ors who have learned to put up with their idiosyncrasies. 
In chapter 10, Stephen Pruitt and Maurice Tse revisit the controversial de- 
bate concerning the effects of changes in Federal Reserve margin requirements 
on stock prices, volatility, and liquidity. Recent studies have focused on the 
behavior of the S&P Composite index in response to changes in margin levels, 
but since all securities in this index were listed on either the New York or 
American Stock Exchange over the  1937 to  1974 interval, they all faced the 
same margin constraints at all times. In particular, the extent to which changes 
in margin levels affect marginable stocks relative to their nonmarginable coun- 
terparts-a  statement about cross-sectional differences-cannot  be answered 
by comparing the performance of the same market index over different inter- 
vals of calendar time-a  statement about time-series differences. 
To perform the cross-sectional comparison, Pruitt  and Tse exploit a  1969 
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of  1934, which allows securities 
dealers and brokers to extend margin credit on certain unlisted (OTC) equity 7  Introduction 
securities. They collect daily price data for twenty marginable OTC securities, 
and for twenty  matching nonmarginable  OTC securities during each of  the 
four post- 1969 amendment margin changes (matched by industry, market capi- 
talization, and debvequity ratio), yielding 160 firms in their sample. By com- 
paring the properties of portfolios of marginable and nonmarginable securities 
before and after margin changes, Pruitt and Tse conclude that prices, volatility, 
and liquidity are generally unaffected by margin changes, and any reactions to 
such changes are due to information effects only, and not to changes in invest- 
ors’ margin-imposed binding constraints. 
As with most successful conferences, this conference concluded with many 
more new questions than new answers. The unprecedented breadth of interest 
in the issues surrounding the industrial organization and regulation of the secu- 
rities industry, from such a diverse group of participants, may foreshadow the 
beginnings of a new discipline that, while truly interdisciplinary by its nature, 
has as its main focus the application of economic principles to policy issues in 
the securities industry. It has been my privilege to witness what may have been 
the birth of such a discipline at this NBER conference, and I hope this volume 
will encourage others to participate in this most exciting new venture. 
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